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MENNONITE COs UNDER THE RUSSIAN TSARS (1787-1917) 
By Lawrence Klippenstein 
Lawrence Klippenstein completed his theological (BDiv) and earlier academic arts degrees to conclude 
formal studies with a MA and PhD from the University of Minnesota. He has taught at various places 
including Goshen College, Altona, and Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, and the University of Minnesota. 
Subsequently, he served as director and archivist-historian at the Mennonite Heritage Centre in Winnipeg. 
He did special research on Russian dissidents at Keston College in London, UK and in Moscow, Russia, 
resulting in a volume on Canadian Mennonite history, Mennonites in Western Canada,  numerous articles, 
the dissertation, and most recently, in 2016,  a book on which this article is based, Mennonite 
Conscientious Objectors in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union Before WWII. A major supplement is 
currently under preparation and will be in print shortly. Klippenstein has also served as a book review 
editor of this publication. He is currently retired and resides in Winnipeg, Canada.  
This essay is a slightly revised talk given to the Altona History Seekers at Garden on Tenth on 
March 16, 2017. 
The story of Russian Mennonite conscientious objectors (hereafter COs) is probably not 
well-known. It is a very important story because it explains in large part how it is that we now 
are Canadians and not Russians, why we live where we do, and why this “objecting” feature is 
still a facet of our lives today. Without the events of that story, none of us would be here in 
Altona, Manitoba, Canada, this evening, and in all likelihood, not be what makes us tick. 
The Background for Mennonite CO service in Russia 
You may, if you see fit, blame a sixteenth-century Dutch minister of the Reformation, 
Menno Simons (1496-1562), for giving strong utterance to a newly–discovered nonviolent, 
peace-oriented stream of biblical understanding in Northern Europe. In Reformation times, 
Menno was very much part of the so-called “Anabaptist” redefining of the Christian faith in his 
ministry and territory of travels. 
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 This idea gained a firm footing among the Anabaptist-Mennonite leaders who led so-
called “Mennonite” congregations through decades of precarious existence in that region.1 Here, 
the commitment to abstain from all forms of violence included strong resistance to, indeed at the 
outset, the blanket refusal, to bearing arms of any kind under any circumstances. This 
perspective on life, and attitude toward social and civic/political norms, became a hallmark of the 
entire Mennonite community. 
On Polish lands governing authorities in particular, were, however, relatively tolerant 
toward minorities like the Anabaptist Mennonites who were really held in disdain otherwise, and 
not seldom persecuted, but often put to death in most other European  countries at the time. 
Generally, people could not really grasp the idea of a community living peaceably as Menno 
proclaimed it, including what came to be called “non-resistance,” and a series of other 
reinterpretations of Scripture among his followers. The existence of pacifist thinking and 
teaching among Mennonites did not appear to trouble Polish ruling authorities unduly. It was 
possible to work out agreements of toleration and even exemption from military service with 
Polish kings, quite in contrast to the thinking of ruling Prussian kings when these became 
dominant in northern Polish lands.   
Under the new ruling by Prussian kings, Mennonites soon realized that Prussian rulers 
had a strong bias favoring governing policy that called for building up a powerful Prussian army. 
They exhausted every source of getting new recruits as soldiers that they could lay their hands on 
                                                 
1
 The context of early Anabaptist revisionism, and Menno’s work too , has been referred to sometimes as dealing 
really with non-Catholic, even non-Protestant interpretations of Scripture They have recently been restated in Palmer 
Becker, Anabaptist Essentials: Ten Signs of a Unique Christian Faith ((Scottsdale: Herald Press,2016). See also 
Abraham Friesen, Menno Simons :Dutch Reformer Between Luther, Erasmus and the Holy Spirit (Fresno, CA: 
Xlibris, 2015), and Peter J. Klassen, Mennonites in Early Modern Poland and Prussia (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2009).   
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 when possible, including the strong sons of Mennonite families.
2
 Mennonite leaders became 
more and more troubled as they increasingly noticed that more laws were being enacted by the 
Prussian rulers to resist appeals for legal recognition of non-involvement in military service. 
They saw more trouble ahead.  
Then the Mennonites got an important break. Just as the Prussian situation was becoming 
increasingly more threatening, a solution seemed heaven-sent. It came from Russia, from the 
new tsarina, Catherine II. Right from the outset of her rule in 1762, she began to recruit West 
European farming types to take up settlement lands in sparsely-settled Central and New Russia 
(later Ukraine). One of Tsarina Catherine’s immigration agents, Georg Trappe, learned about the 
West Prussian Mennonite farmers and others who were unhappy in their situations under 
Prussian kings. He went to check it out in the Danzig area, and set out at once to persuade the 
locals to gather up people interested in leaving Prussia to go to New Russia and resettle there. 
Trappe reported his successes to the royal Russian court and was given the green light to 
proceed.  
He also discovered immediately that the Prussian authorities opposed his idea of taking 
hard- working people from Fredrican Prussia to New Russia. Still, after carrying out a scouting 
trip to New Russia with two delegates, Jacob Hoeppner and Johann Bartsch, to check out the 
options in New Russia, and meeting the governor, Grigorii Potemkin, the scouts were ready to 
recommend the move. Before returning, they had worked out a charter of settlement (called a 20 
Point Petition) with Potemkin. The scouts said if the governor would accept the petition, a large 
                                                 
2
 Prussian governing ideals in this regard are explored quite thoroughly in Mark Jantzen, Mennonite German 
Soldiers: Nation, Religion and Family in the Prussian East, 1772-1880 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
2010), A good treatment of what Mennonites had been given under the Polish rulers is available now in Wilhelm 
Mannhardt, The Military Exemption of the Mennonites of Provincial Prussia (North Newton: Bethel College, 2013, 
translated by Anthony Epp from a German version , Die Wehrfreiheitt der Altpreusssischen Mennoniten: Eine 
geschichtliche Eroerterung published in Marienburg, Prussia, in 1863. 
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 group of Mennonite families would prepare to move to New (South) Russia immediately. It 
should be underlined here that the scouts had been informed by the tsarina’s public manifestoes 
(the most recent one of 1785 included) that the terms of settlement (later called a privilegium) 
included protection of their right to freedom of worship and also exemption from military 
service. The scouts added the words “for all time” to the exemption clause, and got assent of that 
emendation also.  
Adding this wording was not a casual restatement. Hoeppner and Bartsch understood 
them to be a solemn word of assurance from the royal court that would apply to the community 
as long as the tsars ruled in Russia, and would be regarded that way by all future Russian heads 
of state. With the signature of the governor soon to be bolstered by that of the tsarina, Catherine, 
herself, the scouts had every reason to believe that this primary charter now permanently 
established the kind of contract they needed to bring home to Prussia. Their people would now 
realize that they had all the backing and security they needed for a protected legal and permanent 
domicile in New Russia. In the last days of October, 1786, the first pioneers prepared to board 
ship at Danzig and be on their way. 
The year of the scouting in New Russia, 1786, thus became the founding year of these 
Mennonite peace–questing colonies in their new world.  The actual move of several hundred 
families to a place to be called Chortitza on the lower Dnieper River would follow in a year or 
so. The ensuing sojourn under the jurisdiction of the Russian tsars would endure for almost 130 
years. It may not have been the best of all possible options for a new home. However, it would 
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 endure for more than four generations with a deal which completely freed them from military 
service under the tsars through that entire time. 
3
 
The details of pioneering in a strange new setting, as well as establishing their own  
cultural milieu and community organization must be left for another occasion, as their future was 
unknown to all. The Mennonites of New  Russia could not have known, for example, that the 
Russian tsars would take them all through six minor and major wars before a different and much 
worse cataclysm would engulf them, and their peace theses would be tested as never before. The 
tsars themselves would be gone by then and new leaders would take them all in a direction none 
could have anticipated when they made the move over a century before.
4
  
In this further discourse, our theme can be meaningfully linked to these military ventures. 
Each one of the wars impacted the new Mennonites as it did other Russians in some form. In 
each one, the issue of military service would need to be looked at by the Mennonites and by the 
leaders of their new adopted homeland. In my further comments, I want to put a magnifying 
glass up close to each of these half-dozen military situations to see what each one of those 
encounters looked like for the Mennonites closer up, especially as it concerned their exempted 
military service privileges prevailing throughout these embattled occasions.  
 
The Vanishing Turkish Front, 1787-1792 
The lands which the tsarina wanted settled in New Russia included large areas that had 
belonged to Turkey until just before the Prussian Mennonite emigration took place in 1788-89. 
                                                 
3
 A brief account of the move and establishment of the first Mennonite communities in New Russia is found in 
Lawrence Klippenstein, “The Mennonite Migration to Russia 1786-1806” in John Friesen, ed , Mennonites in 
Russia. Essays in Honour of Gerhard Lohrenz (Winnipeg, MB: CMBC Publictions, 1989), 1- 42. 
4
 A skeletal discussion of these military encounters can be found in numerous treatments of Russian history. A title 
that has endured through at least five (?) editions in Russian historical studies in English-speaking countries is 
Nicholas V. Riasonovsky, A History of Russia (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, Fourth 
edition).  
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 Seemingly, Potemkin, the local governor, viewed this region as quite secure when he virtually 
opened this entire region for inspections by the land scouts, Hoeppner and Bartsch. It was clear 
when decisions were made about the settlement availability of the Berislav region that the new 
immigrants would travel through not too far away from what was once the front, where Turkish 
and Russian armies had fought fierce battles not many years before.   
In fact, when the first immigrant families approached this region where they would find 
their destination by earlier arrangements, they were told by Governor Potemkin that because of 
the recent war with the Turks, they would not be able to settle as arranged with Heppner and 
Bartsch on their initial tour. Potemkin simply told the leaders then, the former land scouts, they 
would need to move on further up the Dnieper River where they would be given a place to settle 
down. He told them he was sure this area would meet their needs. Whether the change was 
actually required because of real existing dangers, or was made for other reasons which 
Potemkin was keeping secret, has never been quite discerned by historians even today.
5
  
As it turned out, this “full satisfaction with the new site” never happened. Some 
emigrants certainly will have had immediate reservations about the security of the whole region. 
Not too surprisingly, many of the travelers actually blamed Hoeppner and Bartsch for this fiasco, 
and never quite forgave them for this “big mistake.”  This war had already dealt them a bitter 
blow. Their response was not nearly as peaceful as it ought to have been. Most of the emigrants 
were so upset that when they got to the place newly assigned to them, they refused to unload 
their goods and settle down. With the little Chortitza River running right through the settlement 
area, it seemed to be all hills and valleys, completely useless for farming which they wanted so 
badly to do. They were given places and food to survive the winter, while Hoeppner and Bartsch 
                                                 
5
 The career account of Governor Potemkin and fairly detailed descriptions of the progress of subjugating the former 
Turkish possessions to Russian rule, are found in Simon Sebag Montefiore, Potemkin: Catherine the Great’s 
Imperial Partner (New York: Random House Inc./Vintage Books, 2005). 
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 chose places for new homes and began building at once. They got some of the best spots in the 
whole area as a result.  There were no guns on hand to start a real rebellion, but feelings were 
remembered that may well have affected responses to the tsar in the next war he had to face not 
much later.
6
 
 
Napoleon’s March on Moscow, 1812 
 Napoleon’s march on Moscow in 1812 was meant to be the start and finish of 
conquering all of Russia. But, all of Moscow was burning when he got there. Russian governing 
authorities and most of the population had fled east. Winter had come and provisions for the 
army and animals were nonexistent. Napoleon knew they had to retreat and did so. This invasion 
displayed for all to see the greatest defeat the powerful armies of Napoleon had ever known. 
Ninety percent of his military force was left behind, either dead or imprisoned, as the remaining 
60,000 were starving, and freezing French and allied soldiers who had crossed the Russian 
border now headed westward or home. Only a handful made it all the way.
7
  
The Mennonites residing in New Russia lived far removed from the conflict. Still they 
were made aware of the tsar’s struggle when they got his “invitation” to gather “contributions” 
of money for the government to help defeat the dreaded invader, Napoleon.  When the village 
mayors sent around the offering baskets to their villages, the response was hardly overwhelming. 
There was, of course, no call for Mennonites to become regulars in the tsar’s army because the 
Privilegium promising exemption from military service remained firmly in place.
8
 The majority 
                                                 
6
 See also the discussion of these pioneer years in James Urry, None But Saints, The Transformation of Mennonite 
Life in Russia 1789-1889 (Winnipeg, MB: Hyperion Press, 1989), 34-63. 
7
 Familiar commentary on the war is found in Leo Tolstoy’s well-known novel, War and Peace. See also the notes 
on Napoleon in Riasonovsky, A History of Russia, 693 and index references.  
8
 Around 1800 Paul I had confirmed the Charter of Settlement of 1787 with a formal document that came to be 
called a Privilegium in which the tsarist commitment to permit Mennonites total exemption from military service 
held central significance for the Mennonites. It would become the mostly highly- prized document in the archives of 
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 of the village leaders, however, believed they could hardly ignore the directive from the tsar 
altogether. It would be seen as the highest order of ingratitude to their tsar.   
There was in fact no strong consensus among Mennonite leaders as to what would be 
their obligation given the exemption they had been granted. Indeed, one of the younger 
ministers, Klaas Reimer, who had moved to Molotschna from West Prussia not many years 
before, forthrightly announced his belief, quite strongly held , that any help given to the war 
effort by Mennonites would be an unbiblical act. He clearly included the recent call for 
contributions from the tsar to be the sort of thing not to do,  if gifts were given that needed to be 
condemned. He remained a lone figure among the leaders, with that view. While certainly 
creating hesitancy for some villagers, it did not, however, totally prevent a collection from being 
held, and the total (no record available) was sent on to the tsar. It is very possible that some gifts 
in kind went along, though records do not give details on that. 
9
    
This event no doubt caused Reimer a number of concerns and misgivings he had about 
church life in the Mennonite settlements. In the same year that Napoleon entered Moscow, 
Reimer called fellow believers and followers of his to form an independent worship group not 
subject to the established Mennonite leadership. Though supported by a strong co-leader, 
Cornelius Janzen, the group remained small, and in popular parlance came to be known as the 
“small church” (kleine Gemeinde), a title some descended followers of Klaas Reimer hold to this 
day. The actual peace-making power of calling for peaceful living remained to be tested again in 
other arenas at another time.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the colony, and was kept under rigid security .It is believed that the original document was destroyed as part of 
ravaging committed among Mennonites in the Russian Civil War of 1918 – 1921. See the index of references to 
Privilegium in James Urry, None But Saints, 319. 
9
 The Reimer protest is discussed in more detail in Lawrence Klippenstein, “Mennonite Pacifism and State Service 
in Russia: A Case Study in Church- State Relations: 1789-1936,” unpublished PHD dissertation, University of 
Minnesota, 1984, 22ff. 
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  In future times, however, when the exemption issue came to the fore among Russian 
Mennonites, it tended to be persons from this “small” group who would most readily declare 
themselves willing to challenge state authorities when state policies seemed to threaten the old 
Privilegium arrangements in any way.  
 
The Crimean War, 1853-1856  
The most dramatic early challenge for Mennonites to serve under the terms of the 1787 
and 1800 Privilegia sprang from the challenges of the Crimean War, as Russia fought to hold 
back an invasion by Britain, France, Austria, Turkey, and Prussia in 1853-56. Fought this time in 
the general proximity of the Mennonite “mother” colonies, Chortitza and Molotschna, the issue 
of military service was brought much closer to home, arriving with an impact that no other 
military engagements until then had made on the foreign colonists, including the Mennonites of 
New Russia.  
Beginning the invasion with a naval attack on the Crimean shoreline in the extreme 
southern border of Russia gave the Western Allies an early advantage. It offered easy access to 
the Russian mainland, albeit at a very heavily–fortified site, namely the seaport of Sevastopol. 
For Russia, it was a losing battle from the outset.  Fighting here involved long distances that 
Russian supplies would have to be transported, with open shelling of Russian ports readily 
possible all along the northern coastline of the Azov and Black Sea littoral. Russia was not at all 
prepared for another war, and the successes of putting down rebellious elements elsewhere in 
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 eastern Europe may have led the tsar to a “resting on laurels” that was not really compatible with 
realities of the military situation.
10
  
 The second (some would say, the first) version of the Mennonite Privilegium, handed to 
the Mennonites by Paul I in 1800, had expanded a clause to make more explicit what kind of 
responsibilities would accrue to Mennonites if they were in the path of moving war materiel  and 
personnel. The Privilegium as amended called for Mennonites to assist transport by keeping 
roads and bridges in good repair and by offering transport help if needed in battles fought during 
such wars. As it happened, the location of the new settlements, Chortitza and Molotschna, put 
them directly in the path of troop and other movements headed for the battlefields of Crimea. 
The colonies were also well resourced with various provisions and supplies that were of real 
importance to the Russians at war.  Hence, not surprisingly, almost immediately after the 
outbreak of the war, Mennonite village reeves received  orders from the top Russian war 
authorities to notify each village to prepare to transport goods and soldiers to north shore 
Crimean War depots and battle lines.  
Without undue delay (again leaning on the good organizing abilities of  Mennonite 
property holders), then came hundreds of sturdy wagons and teams to pull them, and drivers to 
direct all transports, as thousands of loads of hay and other fodder and supplies for Russian 
soldiers moved southward toward designated destinations of Russian supply stations and action 
lines. These same vehicles with their drivers were then instructed to load wounded soldiers to 
take back to the colonies to be placed in clinics, homes, and wherever aid could be given to 
prepare them to rejoin their comrades in battle. The wagons tended to travel in convoys, often 
through mud and swampy areas so they came to known as podvods, i.e. loads travelling through 
                                                 
10
 Lawrence Klippenstein,“Mennonite Pacifism and State Service,” 32ff. and his Peace and War. Mennonite 
Conscientious Objectors in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union before WWII, and Other COs in Eastern Europe 
(Winnipeg, MB, Mennonite Heritage Centre, 2016), 33-54. 
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 mud and water. It could take several weeks to make a trip to the front lines and back. Hundreds 
and thousands of loads were going and coming back with whatever needed moving. A small 
allowance was paid by the government for each trip, drivers, and other expenses. Whether 
weapons themselves were moved with the podvods is not clear (one guess is probably). Large 
amounts of money were raised by the colonists to pay for sundry expenses and sent for general 
use to Russian government coffers to pay war costs. No one was recruited from Mennonite 
communities to do any shooting, as far as one can tell from the sources.
11
 Some deaths resulted 
among drivers and other Mennonite families by disease or accidents like drowning, etc. (but no 
statistics are available). There is some evidence, however, that people from Kleine Gemeinde 
congregations had again raised questions, at least privately, about whether inappropriate 
compromise of Christian principles was involved in the manner that aid for the war effort was 
asked for by authorities, and given by Mennonite leaders during those war years.   
It could be added that there was very considerable published acclaim among Russian 
military leaders for the willingness of Mennonites to help the war effort in this way—something 
in fact that would be remembered for many decades to come. Notable too is the fact that 
Mennonite leaders had visited Tsar Nicholas I, who remained in office almost to the end of the 
war, (died 1855) to get assurance of his support for the Privilegium. He had wondered, it was 
said, why Mennonites thought this promise of earlier tsars, and the tsarina initially, might at 
some later time come under duress or be revoked.  
 As a matter of fact, the Mennonites were greatly relieved when the war ended in 1856, 
and the war support they had been asked to provide was no longer needed. The Privilegium 
remained intact as a new tsar, Alexander II, took over in 1855 and called for an end to the war. 
                                                 
11
 An account of Mennonite involvements in the war has been published in James Urry and Lawrence Klippenstein, 
“Mennonites and the Crimean War, 1854-1856,” Journal of Mennonite Studies, 7 (1989), 9-32. See also George K 
Epp, Geschichte der Mennoniten in Russland, 1820-1874 Band II (Lage: Logos Verlag, 1998), 83-112. 
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 There is no record available suggesting that the Mennonites then went to him  to also get 
assurance that he would honor the commitment of the government to give military service 
exemptions to Mennonites as earlier Russian rulers had done. In fact, the war had not only 
drained the Mennonite colonies of resources. It had brought benefits to them also. They would 
take note of the attractive large unsettled open areas of the Crimean lands, ready for settlement if 
it could be arranged. They made new contacts for marketing goods. They learned notable things 
about a much larger Russia with greater needs among peasants than they had been aware of 
earlier. And they got to know specific individuals who would be able to give good advice later 
on, like General von Totleben, about whom more will be said later.   
Among the negative results of the war for Mennonites, as it turned out, was the fact that 
the war turned out poorly for Russia. The Russian generals had seen Russian soldiers fight 
bravely, but realized they had lost most of their battles on the field. They were terribly 
embarrassed to see their own armies cut to pieces, seemingly very inferior to those of the other 
European regiments. Tsar Alexander II was easily convinced by his Ministry of War advisors 
that Russia was very badly in need of an overhaul of its military, all the more so because they 
noticed their not-so-friendly neighbor, Frederican Prussia, was steadily strengthening its army 
also.
12
 
 
The New Military Law 
The Mennonites learned about changes coming in Russia’s military policy almost as 
quickly as the press made the news public in 1870. Also almost as quickly, some Mennonite 
leaders who had personal connections in Prussia decided that these moves might be hard to deal 
                                                 
12
 Efforts to strengthen Russian military strength are discussed in Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform 
Era in Russia (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). 
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 with by Mennonites leaders. After a rather hurried investigation of what was in the works, these 
leaders, guided by a certain Cornelius Janzen, a grain buyer and consul of Prussia living in 
Berdiansk, had decided that likely there was no point in even discussing the matter with the 
tsar’s ministers and that the only way to deal with this challenge was to leave the country.13 
In a matter of weeks, perhaps months, they found other church leaders who agreed about 
the move. The whole discussion for these people now firmed up around the decision to leave 
Russia, and possible big problems ahead by doing so. This was still a minority view however. 
Many more of the Mennonite ministers agreed to meet, first to discuss what the proposed new 
legislation really said, and whether it was in fact an attack on their Privilegium, including an end 
to the service exemption arrangements which had held so far.   
Time came to begin discussions with the tsar and his representatives on what to do about 
this situation, given the Mennonite Privilegium, which was still the law of the land. The fact that 
this issue was very quickly beginning to split the total Mennonite community was very easy to 
see. During the next four years, 1870-1874, when the proposal for new military regulations 
moved toward enaction as law, innumerable meetings among the Mennonites would lead nearly 
a dozen different delegations to visit representatives of the tsar or try to see the tsar himself to 
explain Mennonite concerns about the new laws. The tsars, of course, would have much 
preferred to have them all come together in one group (and in the minds of some ministers, 
present their concerns in the Russian language). Each one of the groups sought to remind the 
authorities of the contract “for all time” which had been signed and affirmed by the royal court 
for the past century and a half or more. Each group expressed the hope of Mennonites that this 
                                                 
13
 The early phase of Mennonite reaction to the news about military reforms is dealt with in Gustav E. Reimer and 
G.R. Gaeddert, Exiled by the Czar: Cornelius Jansen and the Great Mennonite Migration 1874 (North Newton: 
Mennonite Publication Office, 1956). See also Lawrence Klippenstein,“Mennonite Pacifism and State Service,” 22-
82. 
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 contract, the Privilegium given by Catherine II and Paul I, would remain in effect as once made 
by the tsars and confirmed by the tsars as time went on.  
They never really got a straightforward promise, confirming that the 85-year- old 
agreement would remain law, and no changes to it were being planned. Then the break came. 
Sometime in the spring of 1874, with the new laws now enacted, the word was passed to all 
Mennonite settlements that a special messenger from the tsar was on his way to deal with the 
matter once and for all. The messenger turned out to be General Eduard Ivanovich von Totleben 
who had learned to know and appreciate Mennonites whom he met as podvod drivers and nurses’ 
aides during the Crimean War. Totleben knew that by this time, thousands of Mennonites were 
either already on their way to North America or would be leaving very shortly. In fact, the first 
group to meet him when he got to Chortitza was the Bergthal people, wanting only to know 
when they would get their visas to leave the country. He also knew that the majority of the 
Mennonites, about two-thirds of them, had not yet decided to leave. The new war regulations for 
Tsarist Russia had, indeed, become law of the land, but it still was not clear exactly how it would 
affect the Mennonite colonies and the promises of the tsar made to them regarding military 
exemption.  
The people who had decided to leave the country were very busy getting ready to go. A 
delegated group, who had come back from visiting Canada, in 1873, to look at the opportunities 
there, gave a very positive report of the prospects. A Privilegium almost like what the tsars had 
given them, definitely including complete exemption from military service was 
14
promised by 
the Canadian government, and with it came very generous offers of almost free land, much of it 
                                                 
14.An account of how the emigration to Canada unfolded is told in William Schroeder, The Bergthal Colony. 
Revised Edition (Winnipeg, MB: CMBC Publiciations,1986), 60ff. See also Adolf Ens, Ernest N. Braun and Henry 
N. Fast, eds. Settlers of the East Reserve:Moving in. Moving Out. Staying (Winnipeg,MB: Manitoba Mennonite 
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 ready for immediate cultivation. Excitement in that group was rising fast. In fact, some who 
headed for the United States had already left Russia. Large numbers were expected to follow, 
some to the USA also, and others to Manitoba in Canada. Then, still in spring, came the striking 
news that a special emissary was coming from the tsar  himself in St. Petersburg to settle this 
whole question once  and for all.  
The general, von Totleben, who had just arrived, tried to encourage the Mennonites to 
stay. Speaking quite fluent German, the general then thanked the people for trusting and 
supporting their tsar so well during the Crimean war, and coming out now to hear him say what 
Tsar Alexander II had to tell them about future plans for improving the lives of the Russian 
people, and allowing the Mennonites to also keep a free conscience about theirs. Von Totleben 
then assured his listeners that their concerns about how the new military laws might affect them 
had been heard, and he was now authorized to give them all an idea to consider as a solution to 
the dilemma of having to now deal with what was called universal military conscription.
15
 He 
then made it clear that complete exemption from serving the country during war time, as the 
Privilegium had once put it, was no longer possible. But the tsar had found another way to solve 
the dilemma. He was giving them permission to serve the country in ways that did not involve 
carrying lethal weapons. The tsar, said von Totleben, was prepared to offer them a choice of one 
of three other kinds of service: one was working in state workshops, another was working in 
forestry maintenance camps, and the third was working on other state projects like building 
roads, etc. Each recruit would need to put in the same length of time as regular army recruits, get 
a small salary from the government, and do the kind of work the Mennonite churches would  
prefer to support. The Mennonite communities would need to pay for housing, upkeep, and 
certain other miscellaneous expenses.   
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The New Alternative Service Program 
After a period of deliberations by smaller local groups, the churches told von Totleben 
that they would be ready to accept the forest camp option as a service alternative for their young 
recruits. Very pleased to hear this feedback, von Totleben prepared his report to the tsar, and set 
out to provide personnel to work out smaller details of a comprehensive program to make this 
plan work.  
Among the terms of the preliminaries of this new plan, the Mennonites were told they 
would be given ten years of time in which to set up initial facilities for the men to be brought to 
certain locations after the camps were completed. These ten years would also be open years for 
the emigration to North America to be completed. 1880 was set as the end of the open period. 
That is when the emigration to North America would end. 
 By that time, about a third of the Russian Mennonite population did in fact leave to go to 
Manitoba in Canada and several western states of the USA. About 7,000 persons ended up in 
Manitoba and about 10,000 in the USA. 
The program outlined for the forestry camps took shape with involvement at ten or more 
camp sites, six major ones  to begin with, near major settlement centers in  the Russian 
guberniias (provinces) of Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson. At least six smaller camps were 
added over the years. Mainly the work involved tree planting and care of existing plantations on 
the still largely bare steppes of South Russia. A special service unit was created for dealing with 
vineyard diseases along the coasts of Crimea and road building in new areas of settlement. 
Dealing with individuals’ needs recruited for service, finances and other administrative needs 
would occupy the Mennonite congregations consistently from now on. A special “Forestry 
Commission” was set up to handle these matters. It would remain active for a time even after the 
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 war ended. All the Mennonite groups, if they remained in Russia, had to work together as one 
body to make all this happen. Ultimately, the mounting living costs and upkeep of the facilities 
that fell on Mennonite home church treasuries would come to a virtual crisis point for the 
community as a whole. The introduction of a revised taxation system for the colonies after 1900 
helped to ease the situation somewhat. It is clear, however, that some debts accrued by the 
program never did get paid during the period of its existence in the tsarist era. The venture had 
been costly and the costs were not always evenly divided among the property holders. Not all 
agreed it had been worth it, but most, it would appear, did think it had been. The men in the 
camps did not always appreciate their “alternative,” but on the whole made the best of it. Some 
claimed it had taught them much that was useful for their later lives.  
The last camp to open was constructed in 1914 in Siberia near the town of Issyl Kul on 
the Trans Siberian railway. One can find traces of the camp there even today, we are told. You 
can see its location on your forestry camp map. World War I broke out about the same time so it 
operated only for about four years.
16
  
 
The Russo-Turkish Balkan War, 1876-1878 
Among the open military conflicts of the nineteenth century, the Russo-Turkish Balkan 
War of 1876-78 may seem like little more than a blip. It did, however, have its bearing on the 
emigration, especially for those heading for the United States. In the mid-seventies, Russia fell 
heir to what one correspondent to North American newspapers called “the fluctuating situation 
regarding Turkey.” A possible confrontation in the Balkans did create Mennonite involvements 
in preparations for fighting there. The Halbstadt volost prepared to outfit a 100-bed hospital to be 
furnished at their own expense. Monies were gathered to help suffering Christians in the 
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 Balkans. Some Russian papers expressed gratitude for emerging Mennonite support even before 
war was officially declared in 1876. A call for transport aid got immediate response. A letter 
assuring the tsar of full (not weapons, of course) Mennonite support in the war was sent to the 
tsar. The Treaty of Stefano brought the conflict with Turkey to an end in 1878. Later that year, 
Mennonites sent representatives to Simferopol to offer congratulations to the tsar for what Russia 
had achieved in the fighting.
17
 
 
The “Small War” with Japan, 1904-1905 
Starting up an unprepared war with Japan was largely meant to distract people from 
growing internal unrest and talk of revolution, i.e. ousting the tsar. Hostilities with Japan in the 
Far East had been simmering for some years. The tsar, now Nicholas II, was well aware of 
growing problems of fighting on his western frontiers, and was reluctant to open another front, 
but finally gave in.  
Large numbers of ill-equipped and poorly trained soldiers (still mostly peasants) were 
sent off to the Port Arthur battlefront (now South Korea). A large flotilla of ships set out to travel 
to the South China Sea to destroy the Japanese navy. Some Russian generals and others 
grumbled about their foolhardy tsar, and this terrible mistake, but the gung ho “hawks” (as we 
call them) felt certain that Russia would win and that morale in the country would then go up 
quickly.  
 As a matter of fact, the war did create quite a lot of enthusiastic support among the 
people, with the help of anti-Japanese propaganda, and what was being promoted as an easy 
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 victory because of Russia’s huge army, and Japanese people deemed unlikely to enter a fight 
with the “Russian bear.”  As it turned out, Mennonite newspapers also stood solidly behind the 
war decision, sharing the voices which spoke of how the tsar had been abused by the Japanese, 
and some, of course, sensing how a quick victory would boost the tsar’s wavering control over 
his people and shut out a revolution at least for a time. Mennonite ministers encouraged young 
men to volunteer for medical services. Their communities raised a total of 300,000 rubles to help 
the hospitals and some fifty Mennonite men volunteered to leave the forestry camps and help in a 
German hospital which had been set up as a mobile clinic on the Far Eastern front line. One 
doctor, Nicolai Friesen, died of exhaustion and probably disease during his work period on the 
front.   
In the end, the Japanese proved to be much more powerful fighters than the Russians, and 
the Russian ships sent out to do battle there were nearly all sunken before they could do any 
damage to the Japanese. Losses of Russian soldiers were huge. It soon became evident that 
Russia was losing and that Nicholas II was ready to make peace before the disaster became any 
worse. An end to the fighting, partly negotiated with American help, came in 1905.  For the 
Russian Mennonite COs, it was the opening up of another area of service, that is, in hospital 
work, which caught the imagination of many Mennonite young service recruits. Hundreds of 
them had become totally disillusioned with the meaninglessness of forest work. They did see 
meaning in helping the wounded and were warmly welcomed in those ranks. For some time now, 
many young men had been looking for some kind of service more challenging and more directly 
helpful to their non-Mennonite neighbors in Russia who were laying down their lives on the 
front lines.
18
  
                                                 
18
 An abbreviated account of the Russo-Japanese War is in Nicholas Riasonovsky, A History of Russia, 401ff. 
Mennonite contributions are summarized in Lawrence Klippenstein, “Mennonite Pacifism and State Service”, 129ff. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2017) XXXVII, 3 100
   
The “Big War,” World War I, 1914 – 1917 
The Mennonite forestry camps had been in operation for more than three decades when 
World War I broke out, and Russia became involved immediately. Very quickly too, hundreds of 
thousands of wounded soldiers needed attention. To deal with that need, several large civilian 
organizations agreed to take over the equipping of hospital trains for that task alone and to 
organize a country-wide system of taking them to, and back from hospitals situated inland. 
Again, Mennonite leaders ordered their CO service recruits to volunteer, and especially 
recommended medical aid involvement. 
Then came the suggestion from Russian authorities that Mennonite COs might be 
prepared to take over part of this task. Mennonites and Russian authorities alike agreed that this 
could work well. A new Moscow office on Nikitinski Street was set up to coordinate the 
transportation and other aspects of this new initiative. A regional hospital was set up in the 
Ekaterinoslav area, and one Jacob Esau was appointed as regional director for Mennonite 
wartime assistance. A certain Armin Lehn from Chortitza took on the job of a Moscow CEO (we 
would say today) i.e. directing the Mennonite side of the venture with Russians, providing 
personnel for other needs of the operation like doctors and on the field administration.   
Very soon, hundreds of trains were moving back and forth between the front lines and 
hospitals further inland to deal with the wounded, and their transport back to the fighting areas in 
the west. It was dangerous work—the shelling, disease rampant in the army, exhaustion from 
overwork, etc. It is estimated that 120 or so COs lost their lives at the front and otherwise in 
hospital train and related action. Meanwhile, entire Mennonite communities were pitching in to 
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 raise funds to provision these trains and give other aid. Those not of the age groups to be 
recruited for active service gave their energies to helping Russian and other farmers with sowing 
fields and bringing in harvests, and other kinds of neighborly assistance to non-Mennonite 
families. Hundreds of thousands of rubles were collected to help needy families and other 
aspects of assistance for the Russian population. 
Very considerable pressures faced Mennonites and other Germans in Russia throughout 
the duration of the war. Very soon, all German-language publications were shut down including 
Der Botschafter and Friedenstimme. Meetings of larger groups using the German language were 
forbidden. Rumors of Mennonites serving as German spies floated about the country-side. New 
laws were passed expropriating German lands in large parts of the country. Huge numbers of 
German families from western parts of Russia migrated eastward. Many stayed in Mennonite 
homes right through the war. In the end, only a very small part of Mennonite property was 
affected.  
Mennonite COs on duty were given a choice of staying in the forest camps or joining 
hospital trains. About half of the Mennonite recruits chose the one option, with the other half 
staying in the camps to a total of about 15,000 men. Many Russian forestry officials vigorously 
resisted the departure of their men to work on trains. The war nevertheless gave hospital train 
service priority. Many Mennonite men were greatly relieved to get this alternative to what the 
camps had called for until now.  
In the meantime, the revolutionary movement headed by Lenin was making headway as it 
became clear that Russia was losing this war; the home front was falling apart, and the 
government itself became less and less able to handle the military crisis and other huge problems 
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 in the country as a whole. Domestic services began to deteriorate quite rapidly.  By the end of 
1916, it was quite clear that Russia would be losing the war on her front at least.  
The Russian government, as it was by then, was being dominated by the Tsarina 
Alexandra allied to her strange companion, Rasputin (which is another story). They and others in 
high places were working to end the war by now, even as the tsar and some of his supporters 
were saying they must fight on. Russia’s allies were pushing them in that same direction as much 
as they could. Lenin arrived in Petrograd by then and was waiting with his forces for the right 
moment to seize government reins and take over control of all Russia. When the tsar decided to 
personally go to the front and lead his country to victory, the end came quickly. Other  political 
powers (not yet Lenin though) took more and more control and finally sent the tsar a message in 
early March, 1917, that the only useful next move for him to make was to abdicate and let others 
take over the government. Nicholas did so almost immediately and his family was taken into 
custody by the Bolshevik forces, and was executed in July, 1918. He had attempted desperately 
to find a successor but found none except Michael II, a brother, who resigned after a day on the 
throne. With that, the period of the ruling tsars of Russia had come to its tragic, inglorious end.
19
   
 
Termination of the CO Camps 
The new, so-called Provisional Government was now led by a socialist, Alexander 
Kerensky. He appointed new ministers, to a democratic cabinet, and decided to keep the war 
going, as a socialist but still legitimate body of rulers, to keep the country together. But it was 
too late. In a matter of months, Lenin had pulled together key leaders of Bolsheviks to take over 
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 key posts and led from there.  Before that happened, in October, 1917, the Kerensky government 
informed all Mennonite COs that they were free to terminate their service work and return home. 
Most medical workers did so immediately and with them, many of the foresters. Some of the 
latter stayed to deal with last-minute tasks in the camps and then most in 1917, and some in 
1918, made their way home as well. Camp property was mostly auctioned off or sold, some 
taken home perhaps, or some appropriated by neighboring Russians. The Mennonite forestry 
service council functioned for a time with discussion of large debts they had outstanding with the 
forestry program, and how the returning men from the camps could be helped to find their way 
back into civilian life as soon as possible. 
20
   
Many discussions took place when the young men returned from service and began to 
raise serious questions about the needs of Russian people and the challenge of helping the poor 
and needy with resources so bountifully remaining in Mennonites’ hands. Such “revolutionary 
talk” was sometimes difficult to deal with by the Mennonite elders and older leaders of the 
churches.   
Many memories of those days and experiences would survive in the lives of persons and 
their descendants who emigrated to other countries during the Soviet period and later. It is 
interesting to observe that many features of the World War II Canadian Mennonite CO service 
arrangements for exemption from military service closely resembled the system which had been 
first crafted in Russia, and so to speak, tested there, by Mennonite COs of the tsarist era, which 
ended in 1917.  
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A new book* was written recently to tell more of the story and commemorates this year, the end 
of Mennonite CO service under the Russian tsars. A fuller evaluation of the wider impact and 
significance of the work of the conscientious objectors awaits. 
                                                 
* See Peace and War. Mennonite Conscientious Objectors in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet 
Union Before World War II and Other COs in Eastern Europe (Winnipeg, Manitoba: 
Mennonite Heritage Centre, 2016), pb., 367 pages, $ 25.00 CND, $30.00.00 US including 
postage if sent out of Canada. A CD and online versions are also available.  
To get a copy of one or more of these versions, contact lawklippenstein@shaw.ca or phone 1-
204-221-6473. If no answer, leave a message. 
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